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THE 1979 FLORIDA WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORM:
BACK TO BASICS*
WILLIAM E. SADOWSKI, JACK HERZOG, R. TERRY BUTLER,
AND RUTH L. GOKEL**
I. THEORY OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The rapid industrialization in Western Europe and the United
States in the second half of the nineteenth century inevitably re-
sulted in a great increase in the number of work-related injuries. At
the same time remedies available to injured workers were being
severely restricted.' Workers in Europe were somewhat better off
than those in the United States where "only an estimated 15 percent
of the injured employees ever recovered damages." 2 The expensive
litigation process and the defenses available to the employer made
it highly unlikely that a worker would recover at all much less re-
cover actual losses, general damages, and future loss of earning
capacity.3 Obviously, litigation in tort was not the answer.
The response came in the form of statutory enactments which
eliminated recovery in tort and substituted a new system. This sys-
tem had a different philosophy than that of the very individualistic
common law system.
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is
belief in the wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most digni-
fied and most certain form, financial and medical benefits for the
victims of work-connected injuries which an enlightened com-
munity would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less
satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of these payments
* The subtitle is taken from a speech given by Dr. Arthur Larson at the 3rd Annual
National Symposium on Workers' Compensation, in Orono, Maine (July 9, 1979).
** William E. Sadowski is the Chairman, House Insurance Committee, Florida Legisla-
ture; B.A. 1966, University of Florida; J.D. 1969, University of Florida College of Law.
Jack Herzog is the Staff Director, House Insurance Committee, Florida Legislature; B.A.
1965, University of Florida; M.A. 1968, University of Florida; J.D. 1970, University of Florida
College of Law.
R. Terry Butler is an Attorney/Analyst, House Insurance Committee, Florida Legislature;
B.A. 1974, Miami (Ohio) University; J.D. 1978, Florida State University College of Law.
Ruth L. Gokel is an Attorney/Analyst, House Insurance Committee, Florida Legislature;
B.A. 1965, Tulane University; M.A. 1967, Columbia University; J.D. 1978, Florida State
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1. The development of workers' compensation systems is discussed in an excellent article
by Arthur Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
206 (1952). See also Weinstein, Big Business and the Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 8
LAB. HIST. 156 (1967).
2. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 157.
3. Larson, supra note 1, at 223-25.
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to the most appropriate source of payment, the consumer of the
product.'
In exchange, then, for the certainty of compensation, the worker
relinquishes the right to a jury trial and general damages. In ex-
change for limited liability, the employer agrees to pay without
regard to fault.5 The worker, of course, was not really giving up that
much since he rarely recovered anyway. The employer was freed
from the problems of litigation and could pass his expenses on to
the consumer of his products. Though employers and employees
adapt rather readily to new systems, lawyers are the slowest to
adapt since fault must be disregarded and since the worker is not
intended to recover the very large amounts which are occasionally
awarded by juries.' Under basic compensation theory, a worker's
entitlement to recovery thus depends on the answers to only two
questions: (1) was his injury work-related? and (2) did his injury
cause a loss in wages?7 It follows inexorably therefore that a workers'
compensation system will function properly if it operates almost
automatically (self-executing) and if it compensates the worker for
his actual losses (medical expenses and wage loss). Any importation
of tort theory invites litigation with its attendant delays and expen-
ses. Any compensation based on estimates of losses rather than on
actual losses invites even more litigation and results inevitably in
inequity: overpayment in some cases, underpayment in others.
The systems operating in the various United States today are
almost uniformly burdened by high costs. Upon examination, one
finds that these high costs are the result of litigation which in turn
is the result of benefits payable on the basis of guesses. It need not
have been that way. The United States might have patterned its
workers' compensation system on the German model.
In 1884, Germany enacted a comprehensive package of compul-
sory insurance to provide coverage for sickness, accidents, old age
and invalidity.' These enactments were based on an idea in stark
contrast to the prevailing laissez faire. This was "the idea that a
4. Id. at 209.
5. There are exceptions to this in most state statutes providing some kind of penalty on
the worker for the willful failure to use a safety appliance. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(4) (1977).
6. Larson, supra note 1, at 207-10.
7. Id. at 212-13.
8. J. BROOKS, COMPULSORY INSURANCE IN GERMANY, S. Doc. No. 66, 52d Cong., 2d Sess. 36
(1893). In this report the U.S. Commissioner of Labor describes the three forms of compulsory
insurance in force in Germany: sickness, accident, and old age and invalidity. The report
contains a summary of each act and the text of the act (in English). Commentary within the
report will hereinafter be cited as COMPULSORY INSURANCE; the text of the Act for Insurance
Against Accidents will hereinafter be cited as GERMAN ACT.
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large proportion of the misfortunes, sickness, accident, and prema-
ture age are social in origin rather than individual; that a vast part
of these evils spring, not from the fault of the individual, but from
sources over which the individual has little or no control."9 In addi-
tion to philosophy, there were political reasons for these enact-
ments. Those reasons may be found in the history of socialist activi-
ties prior to passage of the comprehensive insurance system and
particularly in the increasing influence of the Marxist socialists at
the expense of the more moderate Fabian socialists.'0 The prime
sponsor of these acts was Otto von Bismarck. In a classic political
maneuver, Bismarck took the "wind from the sails of his enemies"
by putting the state "fearlessly at the disposal of the laboring
classes" with the "elaborate scheme of compulsory insurance of the
working classes.""
This coverage was paid for by both workers and employers. Work-
ers paid two-thirds, and employers one-third, into the Sickness
Fund; only employers contributed to the Accident Fund; and work-
ers and employers each contributed one-half to the Disability
Fund." Because of the benefit structure, workers actually contrib-
uted part of what we would consider the "premium," in contrast to
the present American system. The Sickness Fund (to which the
worker had contributed two-thirds) paid for medical treatment for
the first thirteen weeks.' 3 Beginning in the fourteenth week, the
Accident Fund (to which only the employer had contributed) paid
medical and indemnity benefits.' The worker thus had more than
a three-month waiting period before his indemnity benefits began.
The system was administered by representatives of employers and
employees under government supervision.' 5 The benefit structure
was similar to what we know today. The injured worker was paid
66 2/3% of his previous average daily earnings "in case of complete
inability to work."'" And for partial disability the German system
used the same guessing procedure employed in most states today;
partial disability payments were "to be determined according to the
measure of earning capacity that remains."'" The determination of
disability was made by a doctor and most often appealed by the
9. COMPULSORY INSURANCE, supra note 8, at 19.
10. Id. at 26-29.
11. Id. at 29.
12. Larson, supra note 1, at 230.
13. COMPULSORY INSURANCE, supra note 8, at 91.
14. GERMAN Acr, supra note 8, § 5.
15. Id. §§ 12-42.
16. Id. § 5.
17. Id.
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worker rather than the employer because "the appeal costs him
nothing."'"
Despite the flaw in the partial disability determination proce-
dure, the German system was admirable. First, it was comprehen-
sive; some part of the system was available to respond to any situa-
tion. There would be, for example, no impetus to seek a workers'
compensation disability determination to provide retirement in-
come since another part of the system addressed the question of old
age. Second, employers and employees ran the system; they were
the governmental agency and they could keep each other honest.
The diffusion of responsibility and activities among employees,
workers, lawyers, insurance carriers and government bureaus sim-
ply did not exist. And third, since a worker had comprehensive
coverage, there was no particular reason to restrict coverage by de-
nying that there was an accident or that the accident was work-
related. The German act refers almost casually-to insuring workers
"against accidents occurring in the course of their occupations."' 19
Even with the guessing about partial disability, the German system
more nearly approached the ideal than did the British system. Al-
most as an inevitability, therefore, only two of the states modeled
their workers' compensation laws after Germany's, while the rest
used Britain's as their model. 0
The British act, passed in 1897, differed considerably from the
German in that it was a reluctant response to a bad situation. 2' The
system is heavily weighted in favor of the employer. In contrast to
the more off-hand attitude in the German act toward the coverage
provided, the British act was careful to cover only "personal injury
by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment."
In the event of negligence by the employer, the injured worker had
the option of claiming compensation under the act or filing a law-
suit. And if the injury to the worker was "attributable to the serious
and willful misconduct of that workman, any compensation claimed
in respect of that injury shall be disallowed." 3 Such language would
obviously prove fertile ground for litigation.
The British act also contained procedural roadblocks. For exam-
18. COMPULSORY INSURANCE, supra note 8, at 88.
19. GERMAN ACr, supra note 8, § 1.
20. The two states were Washington and Ohio. Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's
Compensation as Social Insurance: A Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L.
REV. 57, 61.
21. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37. Note that this first act has
been replaced by a national insurance system. For a discussion of this system and its relation
to the United States system, see Larson supra note 1, at 216-17.
22. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, § 1.
23. Id
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pie: "Proceedings for the recovery under this Act of compensation
for an injury shall not be maintainable unless notice of the accident
has been given as soon as practicable after the happening thereof."' 4
Section 2 of the British act then goes on for five subsections With
the minutiae of notice.
Another interesting feature is the treatment of lump sum settle-
ments. 5 Under the German act, lump sums were to be paid only in
"exceptional cases. ' 2 Under the British act, an employer could cash
out his liability after weekly payments had been made for six
months.? If the purpose of a compensation act is to prevent injured
workers from becoming a burden on society, a series of weekly pay-
ments is much more likely to accomplish that aim than a one-shot
payment.
Despite these drawbacks, most of the states used the British sys-
tem as their model. After a period of intensive activity following the
1893 study of the German system prepared by the United States
Commissioner of Labor,2 8 New York passed an act with compulsory
coverage in 1910.2 The act was limited to certain "especially dan-
gerous" employments, 30 and in other aspects was obviously based on
the British act. New York used the familiar basis of liability,
"personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment," '3' and also permitted actions under common law.
32
New York also used the guessing procedure to'determine payments
for partial incapacity.3 3 The only enforcement mechanism seems to
have been an action at law brought by the injured workers.34 Even
as heavily overlaid with tort concepts as it was, the act was too
"revolutionary" for the New York Court of Appeals and was held
unconstitutional in 1911.3 For the court, compensation theory was
"not merely new in our system of jurisprudence, but plainly an-
tagonistic to its basic idea. ' 36 The court stated that if the legisla-
24. Id. § 2.
25. Commonly called "washouts" in the Florida system. See ch. 79-40, § 16, 1979 Fla.
Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.20) in which the German choice was selected,
even though the legislature was not aware of this nineteenth century background.
26. COMPULSORY INSURANCE, supra note 8, at 91.
27. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, sched. 1, § 13.
28. COMPULSORY INSURANCE, supra note 8. For a summary of this activity, see Larson,
supra note 1, at 231-33.
29. 1910 N.Y. Laws, ch. 674.
30. Id. § 215.
31. Id. § 217.
32. Id. § 218.
33. Id. § 219-a.
34. Id. § 219-d.
35. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
36. Id. at 440.
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ture could impose a liability on an employer solely because "his
business is inherently dangerous, it is equally competent to visit
upon him a special tax for the support of hospitals and other chari-
table institutions, upon the theory that they are devoted largely to
the alleviation of ills primarily due to his business. ' 37 Thus, the
New York act was held unconstitutional as "a taking of property
without due process of law.
'3
This decision, however, created an uproar. The ruling enraged
Theodore Roosevelt who complained that such decisions for the past
twenty-five years had served as a bar to social reform. 39 An amend-
ment to the New York Constitution was soon adopted that cured the
constitutional defect.40
In contrast to New York, Massachusetts' first comprehensive law,
passed in 1911,11 was held constitutional. 2 The act was much more
detailed than the New York act and more liberal in benefits for the
worker. The act provided for an industrial accident board to make
rules to carry out the act," and also created the Massachusetts
Employees Insurance Association which self-insured its subscribers
under the supervision of the insurance department.4 While both
New York and Massachusetts paid workers at 50% of their average
weekly earnings,45 Massachusetts also required the employer to
"furnish reasonable medical and hospital services, and medicines
when they are needed."4 New York referred to physicians and sur-
geons only to require the worker to submit himself for an examina-
tion if requested and to penalize him for refusal. 7 Massachusetts
benefits also included a schedule for amputations,48 and specifically
prohibited a set off for any "savings or insurance of the injured
employee" or for "benefits derived from any other source" in deter-
mining the compensation payments.49 But the Massachusetts act
did not differ from the New York act in substituting a statutory
compensation system for actions at common law. Still, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court held the act constitutional, stating
37. Id.
38. Id. at 448.
39. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 170.
40. Id. at 171.
41. 1911 Mass. Acts, ch. 751.
42. In re Opinion of Justices, 96 N.E. 308 (Mass. 1911).
43. 1911 Mass. Acts, ch. 751, pt. III, §§ 1-18.
44. Id. pt. IV, §§ 1-24. Employers could also insure with a commercial carrier. Id., pt. V.
§ 3.
45. 1910 N.Y. Laws, ch. 674, § 219-a; 1911 Mass. Acts, ch. 751, pt. II, § 6.
46. 1911 Mass. Acts, ch. 751, pt. II, § 5.
47. 1910 N.Y. Laws, ch. 674, § 219-b.
48. 1911 Mass. Acts, ch. 751, pt. II, § 11.
49. Id. § 12.
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that the act does not "authorize the taking of property without due
process of law" in contrast to New York's decision, and that "there
is nothing in [the act] which violates any rights secured by the
state or federal Constitutions."50
Another early compensation law, Washington State's, was also
held constitutional by the state supreme court.51 The Washington
act was based on the German system, which the court characterized
as the "most sweeping," rather than on the English system, which
the court found "least interferes with employers. '5 2 In exploring
"this noble legislation," the court articulated the fundamentals of
compensation theory:
Our act came of a great compromise between employers and
employed. Both had suffered under the old system; the employers
by heavy judgments of which half was opposing lawyers' booty, the
workmen through the old defenses or exhaustion in wasteful litiga-
tion. Both wanted peace. The master, in exchange for limited lia-
bility, was willing to pay on some claims in future, where in the
past there had been no liability at all. The servant was willing, not
only to give up trial by jury, but to accept far less than he had often
won in court; provided he was sure to get the small sum without
having to fight for it. All agreed that the blood of the workman was
the cost of production, that the industry should bear the charge.
5 3
Thus the Washington system was deliberately designed to provide
sure compensation in exchange for the elimination of litigation. The
court noted that the English system "had already begotten whole
volumes of contests" over the meanings of words. 4 Rather than fall
into the same trap, the Washington court opted for liberality in
interpretation in exchange for an end to litigation. "Under our stat-
utes the workman is the soldier of organized industry accepting a
kind of pension in exchange for absolute insurance on his master's
premises." 5
The United States Supreme Court decided the issue in favor of
the validity of workers' compensation laws in 1917,56 and by 1920,
workers in some forty states were covered. 7 Florida enacted its law
50. In re Opinion of Justices, 96 N.E. 308, 315 (Mass. 1911).
51. Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 158 P. 256 (Wash. 1916).
52. Id. at 258.
53. Id.
54. Id. The same may accurately be said of Florida as well.
55. Id. at 263.
56. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243
U.S. 210 (1917); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
57. Brodie, supra note 20, at 63.
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in 1935;11 the final state to act was Mississippi, in 1948.11
This brief investigation of the background of workers' compensa-
tion laws shows that these enactments were meant to deal with the
great increase in work-related injuries brought about by the indus-
trialization of Western Europe and the United States beginning in
the second half of the nineteenth century. Since litigation under the
tort system was both protracted in process and unpredictable in
result, the legislative response was to eliminate that system and
replace it with one designed to be self-executing and to replace the
uncertainty of recovery but the possibility of a large recovery under
the tort system with the certainty of a moderate recovery under a
compensation system.
No compensation system can be entirely self-executing since
there will always be some litigable issues such as whether the in-
jured worker was an employee or an independent contractor or
whether the injury was in fact work-related. But considering the
many other issues which must be resolved under the tort system, a
properly organized and properly staffed compensation system more
nearly approaches the self-executing ideal.
The recovery to the worker has been the more difficult of these
two requirements to meet, even though this difficulty is with only
one part of the benefits payable. The sum due for medical benefits
is readily ascertainable. The amount payable on account of death
is set by statute. The compensation payable for total inability to
work is set as a percentage of the preinjury wage and is also easy to
calculate. The problem is partial inability to work, after the injury
has healed. A worker not totally disabled is partially disabled and
he or she is referred to as a "permanent partial." Deciding how to
compensate such a worker is the biggest problem in workers' com-
pensation today: there are a number of systems and all of them are
invitations to litigation. Generally, a permanent partial is to be
compensated according to his loss of earning power (or wage-earning
capacity). One method is to make a guess about what the worker
could have earned had he not been injured. Another method is to
assume that a loss of earning power will result from a physical
impairment and then to compensate the worker based on a guess as
to his degree of impairment. Testimony can be had from an endless
number of experts about loss of earning power or degree of impair-
ment. All are still guesses and all involve litigation.
58. The act was passed in 1935 in 3 separate bills: Ch. 17481, §§ 1-55, 1935 Fla. Laws 1456
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.01 (Supp. 1978)); ch. 17482, §§ 1-3, 1935 Fla. Laws 1495
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.01 (Supp. 1978)); and ch. 17483, §§ 1-3, 1935 Fla. Laws
1496 (current versions at FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (Supp. 1978)).
59. Brodie, supra note 20, at 63.
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A third method of compensating a permanent partial which has
not been tried anywhere in the United States, which has just been
enacted in Florida, and which does not involve guesses, is called
wage-loss. This method assumes, not that a degree of impairment
will reflect loss of wage-earning capacity in the future, but that
actual loss of earnings in the future, in relation to preinjury wages,
is occasioned by the impairment resulting from the injury. This
actual wage loss is what should be compensable. The workers' com-
pensation system was instituted to compensate a worker for his
inability (total or partial) to earn as much after an injury as he had
earned before. The burden of maintaining a worker at a reasonable
standard of living was placed on the industry (and ultimately that
industry's consumers) in which the worker was injured rather than
on the city or county in which the worker lived or on the worker's
own resources. The logical approach to the determination of the
amount of compensation should be to wait and see whether a worker
does in fact suffer a loss of earning power and then compensate him
for that actual loss. How the Florida Legislature arrived at this
conclusion and the reasons for the large number of changes in Flor-
ida's workers' compensation law will be discussed in Part II.
II. FLORIDA WORKERS' COMPENSATION: THE IMPETUS FOR REFORM
The underlying theory of workers' compensation in Florida, as
expressed by the courts, is the same as compensation theory gener-
ally. "Workmen's Compensation . . .proceeds on the theory that
economic loss to the individual by injury in line of duty should be
borne in part by the industry in which he is employed in order that
his dependents may not want." 0 In addition, the two important
features of Florida's system are the same as those elsewhere: a self-
executing system and compensation for loss of earning power.
"[T]he Workmen's Compensation Law [is intended] to be self-
executing and . . .benefits [are] to be paid without the necessity
of any legal or administrative proceedings."'" And, "[t]he intention
of the Act is to compensate the employee for the loss of earning
capacity. If the employee is injured but is able to work, he is not
compensated. '"62
The 1979 legislative reform is an attempt to bring Florida's act
more in line with its underlying theory. The retooling of the Florida
law was necessitated by the high dollar cost of the current system,
its well-intended but inequitable awards, and the delay of claims
60. Duff Hotel Co. V. Ficara, 7 So. 2d 790, 791 (Fla. 1942).
61. A.B. Taff & Sons v. Clark, 110 So. 2d 428, 436 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
62. Allen v. Maxwell Co., 11 So. 2d 572, 575 (Fla. 1943).
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resolution as reflected by a high level of litigation. Put another way,
the act as it actually had been implemented since 1935 no longer
reflected the theories on which it was based.
Costs in Florida have skyrocketed. In 1970, the average benefit
paid for a nondisabling injury was $42.29. In 1978, this amount was
$87.66, an increase of 107%. Similarly, in 1970, the average benefit
paid for a disabling injury was $1,471.53, and in 1978, was $3,281.76,
an increase of 123%. For fatalities, the average benefit paid was
$10,979.49 in 1970, and $32,430.23 in 1978, an increase of 195%.11
Because of these increases in benefits paid, premiums in 1977 were
up by 238% over 1970 levels.
4
The level of litigation in Florida is also much higher than in other
states. A resolved claims study conducted by the National Council
on Compensation Insurance indicated that there was plaintiff attor-
ney involvement in 29.8% of the Florida cases as compared to 2.8%
for Alabama cases and 3% for Wisconsin cases. 5 Claims resolution
in Florida was slower than in Alabama or Wisconsin. Forty-three
percent of the Alabama claims and 31% of the Wisconsin claims
were resolved within thirty days of the injury, while only 10.1% of
the Florida claims were resolved within this same period. 6 These
figures indicate greater administrative friction in the Florida system
as compared to Alabama and Wisconsin.
Given these circumstances, the 1979 legislature had to decide
what its objectives were and how to achieve them. The overall goal
was to reduce costs, in the form of premiums, to the employers of
the state. If the system could more nearly approach the self-
executing ideal, then that part of the costs attributable to litigation
would be significantly reduced. Since the system seemed to function
on guesses (at impairment ratings, at diminution of wage-earning
capacity) and since litigation flourishes when the facts are in doubt,
then the more objectivity that could be included, the more costs
could be reduced. In addition, under a more nearly self-executing
system, more equity could be achieved as between similarly injured
workers than when each worker's award depended on the outcome
and the vagaries of the adversary process.
The primary aspects of compensation theory addressed by the
63. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND PLANNING, DIVISION OF LABOR, FLA. DEP'T OF LABOR AND EM-
PLOYMENT SECURITY, FACTS AsoUr WORKERS COMPENSATION: HIGHLIGHTS FOR FOURTH QUARTER
1978 at 4-5.
64. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND PLANNING, DIVISION OF LABOR, FLA. DEP'T. OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DATA (as of December 31) (Sept. 26, 1978).
65. National Council on Compensation Ins., Workmen's Compensation Resolved Claim
Study: Preliminary Observations on Closed Claims Survey at 4 (1977) (survey available at
the House Insurance Committee, 310 House Office Building, Tallahassee, Fla. 32304).
66. Id. at 5.
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1979 reform are the "guesstimate" provisions encountered in deter-
mining indemnity levels for permanent partial disabilities and the
administrative provisions used in handling a claim. It became ap-
parent early in the hearings held by the Joint Legislative Committee
on Workmen's Compensation that the permanent partial disability
section of the law was considered the primary source of friction
within the system. Statistics for 1978 compiled by the Bureau of
Workmen's Compensation show that of the 452,556 work-related
injuries in that year, only 11,827 resulted in a permanent partial
disability, less than 3% of all injuries. Yet, permanent partial bene-
fits (both compensation and medical) amounted to $114 million of
the total benefits of $257 million paid in 1978, or 44% of the total
benefits. Compensation benefits alone for permanent partial inju-
ries amounted to $71 million, or 28% of the total benefits paid in
1978.7 In addition, a resolved claim study found that plaintiffs'
attorneys were involved in over 70.7% of Florida's permanent partial
cases, but in only 30% of such cases in Alabama and 17.5% in Wis-
consin. 6
Since the basic concept of workers' compensation is to partially
compensate a worker for loss of wages caused by a work-related
injury,69 payments are not intended to equal wages because to do so
would encourage malingering rather than provide an incentive to
return to work. Statutes typically provide for payment of from one-
half to two-thirds of the wages lost as a result of the injury, subject
to minimum and maximum limitations. 0 With regard to partial
disabilities, however, virtually every state has deviated from the
concept of compensating actual economic loss. Under the Florida
Workmen's Compensation Act as it existed prior to the 1979 legisla-
tive session, compensation for workers with permanent partial disa-
bilities consisted of 60% of the employee's average weekly wage for
a particular number of weeks according to a statutory injury sched-
ule. However, for injuries not covered by the schedule, the notorious
paragraph "u" provided a formula for calculating the number of
weeks of benefits based on a physical impairment rating or percen-
tage of diminution of wage-earning capacity, whichever was
67. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND PLANNING, DIVISION OF LABOR, FLA. DEP'T OF LABOR AND EM-
PLOYMENT SECURITY, FACTS ABOUT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: HIGHLIGHTS FOR FOURTH
QUARTER 1978 at 3.
68. National Council on Compensation Ins., Workmen's Compensation Resolved Claim
Study: Resolved Claim Survey at 6 (1977) (survey available at the House Insurance Commit-
tee, 310 House Office Building, Tallahassee, Fla. 32304).
69. See Hill, Actual Wage Loss Theory, BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. DEP'T. OF
LABOR, BULL. 192, at 72 (1956).
70. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U.S., ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS 19-23
(1979).
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greater.7' These latter cases frequently involved soft-tissue injuries
such as back injuries. The injury schedule applied to actual loss or
loss of use of members of the body, eyes, and hearing." Both the
impairment rating, which is the percentage of permanent bodily
impairment sustained by the worker as established by a doctor, and
diminution of wage-earning capacity, which is the percentage of lost
capacity to earn wages as established by a judge of industrial
claims, are difficult to measure and highly subjective.
Compensation based on a schedule or a disability rating is an
arbitrary award in the nature of damages since it is made irrespec-
tive of economic loss. 73 A statutory schedule is intended to represent
a presumption that a particular injury will result in wage loss for
the specified number of weeks. However, the widespread disparity
in scheduled awards from state to state indicates the invalidity of
such an argument. "The failure to anchor the award to wage-loss
is the inherent weakness in the schedule concept."75 In addition, the
use of wage-earning capacity is necessarily arbitrary because there
is no accurate method of measuring the effect of a disability on
future earnings. Since the actual results are not the basis for a
diminution of wage-earning capacity award, such award is again in
the nature of damages rather than compensation for economic loss.
"It is an unrealistic system because the real facts are not the basis
for the award." 6 This subjective aspect is a factor in the high inci-
dence of attorney involvement and litigation. It also results in bene-
fit payments which bear no relationship to the economic loss of the
workers. In some cases workers continue to receive compensation for
weeks after returning to the same job at the same pay, while in other
cases the worker's compensation is exhausted although the prein-
jury earning level has not been reached.
The wage-loss system, adopted by the new law, is thus a return
to the basic philosophy underlying workers' compensation. Through
this change, an attempt is being made to provide equity in compen-
sation; reduce subjectivity in determining compensation; reduce the
need for attorney involvement and litigation; reduce "doctor shop-
71. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(u) (Supp. 1978). The injuries most susceptible to verification
and measurement are listed in subsections (a) through (t) of § 440.15(3). Examples are an
amputated foot, loss of hearing, and disfigurement. The unscheduled injuries (such as back
pain) fall within subsection (u). This subsection became increasingly more notorious as
hearings before the House Insurance Committee continued. Sentiment built up rapidly to
make sure that, if nothing else, something would be done about subsection (u).
72. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(a)-(t) (Supp. 1978).
73. Hill, supra note 69, at 72.
74. ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS, supra note 70, at 22-23.
75. Hill, supra note 69, at 73.
76. Id.
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ping" to obtain higher impairment ratings; provide an incentive for
injured workers to return to work; and provide an incentive for em-
ployers to provide rehabilitation. Florida is the first state to adopt
a comprehensive wage-loss system which substitutes wage-loss and
impairment benefits for the injury schedule and diminution of
wage-earning capacity.77
In addition to the wage-loss concept, the other thrust of the 1979
reform is aimed at substantially improving the self-executing fea-
ture of the system by upgrading the administrative capability of the
Department of Labor and Employment Security. To quote one pro-
ponent, Senator Kenneth MacKay, what Florida needed was an
administrator who acts "like a 600-pound gorilla" with respect to
claims handling."
77. It has been reported that wage-loss systems have been used to some extent in Pennsyl-
vania, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Legislative staff members from both the house and senate
traveled to Wisconsin and Pennsylvania to examine their workers' compensation systems. In
reality, the law in all three states is much more similar to the previous Florida law than to
the new wage-loss system. All three states utilize extensive injury schedules, a concept which
is inconsistent with a true wage-loss system. In addition, the definitions of wage loss in the
Wisconsin and Michigan statutes are in effect nothing more than Florida's former loss of
wage-earning capacity provision.
The weekly wage loss referrdd to in this chapter, ... shall be such percentage
of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee computed according to the
provisions of this section, as shall fairly represent the proportionate extent of the
impairment of his earning capacity in the employment in which he was working at
the time of the injury, and other suitable employments, the same to be fixed as of
the time of the injury, but to be determined in view of the nature and extent of the
injury.
WIS. STAT. § 102.11(3) (1978).
Virtually identical language is contained in the Michigan law. According to a report by
John F. Burton, Jr. and Wayne Vroman, although compensation in Michigan is in theory
based on actual wage loss, "it appears that many, if not most, workers with permanent
injuries sign redemption agreements with their employers. The workers receive cash settle-
ments and the employers are released from liability for any subsequent period of wage loss."
J. Burton & W. Vroman, A Report on Permanent Partial Disabilities Under Workers' Com-
pensation 30 (April, 1978) (unpublished study prepared for the U.S. Department of Com-
merce; available from Workers' Disability Income Systems, Inc., P.O. Box 167, Olympia
Fields, Ill. 60461).
On the other hand, Pennsylvania does compensate many of its injured workers on the basis
of actual wage loss, according to Mr. John Urling, Director of the Bureau of Workers' Com-
pensation, Department of Labor and Industry, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Furthermore, Mr.
Urling and members of his staff stated, in conversation with Florida legislative staff, that they
did not have any substantial problems in the administration and determination of wage-loss
compensation.
78. Senator MacKay (D-Ocala): "I am just saying that I need to know that somebody is
going to start acting like a 600-pound gorilla; and if we can't find that out, I am perfectly
willing to move it anywhere it needs to be moved. I think that is the position we all ought to
take. It doesn't matter to me where [the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation] stays. It's
just got to be a different animal than it is now." Testimony at meeting of House Insurance
Committee (March 7, 1979) (tape on file with House Insurance Committee, 310 House Office
Building, Tallahassee, Fla. 32304).
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The high incidence of litigation and slow delivery of benefits in
Florida can be partially cured by a firm, comprehensive policing of
the entire system. Wisconsin, in particular, was studied as a model
administrative state with regard to workers' compensation." The
new Florida law incorporates many of the administrative procedures
utilized effectively in Wisconsin. The changes require greater com-
munication between the agency and injured workers, employers and
insurance carriers. The agency is required to become involved in the
settlement of disputes before litigation becomes necessary. The
agency is also required to monitor carrier practices and to eliminate
inappropriate practices. These and other administrative changes
are discussed in detail in Part III.
Further changes were made in the judicial and quasi-judicial
parts of the system. Since the system was to be self-executing, it
seemed irrational to refer to hearing officers as judges of industrial
claims and therefore, their designation reverted to "deputy commis-
sioners." In addition, the term "judge" seemed to connote
"litigation" in the minds of injured workers, creating needless ap-
prehension and resulting in an incentive for early attorney involve-
ment. An extension of this feeling resulted in the demise of the
Industrial Relations Commission. Since the hearings were of an
administrative nature before the deputy commissioners, it seemed
logical that appeal should be directly to the courts. The First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, located in Tallahassee, was selected, since the
public was used to appealing to Tallahassee by means of the In-
dustrial Relations Commission. Appeals were centralized in one dis-
trict in order to promote uniformity and consistency.
The 1979 amendments are found in three enactments of which
two are pertinent. The major reform is contained in chapter 79-40
(Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 188); an effective date provi-
sion in chapter 79-41 (Senate Bill 1293); and the clean-up bill, chap-
ter 79-312 (Senate Bill 669), which, among other things, shifted the
effective date to August 1, 1979.
III. SUMMARY OF THE MAIN ASPECTS OF THE 1979 REFORM
A. Introduction
In this section, the major changes made by the 1979 legislature
will be discussed. Note that several changes affect the entire reform.
Specifically, the term "workmen's" was replaced by "workers';" the
Bureau of Workmen's Compensation became the Division of Work-
79. While in Wisconsin, members of the legislative staff learned that there are only 2
attorneys in the entire state of Wisconsin who practice workers' compensation law exclusively.
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ers' Compensation as of August 1; the Judges of Industrial Claims
have been renamed "deputy commissioners;" and the First District
Court of Appeals has replaced the Industrial Relations Commission
as the appeals body for final orders of the deputy commissioners.
The other changes are explained in more detail.8 0
B. Exemptions
1. Officers
The workers' compensation law generally requires that all em-
ployers maintain insurance for all employees. Among the several
exceptions to this rule is the 1978 change in the definition of employ-
ment which allows employers of one or two employees to choose not
to purchase insurance and thus to be exempt from the act.' For the
purposes of this exemption, the Bureau counted corporate officers
as employees even when such officers had elected to be exempt from
coverage. Section 2 of chapter 79-40 changed the definition of em-
ployee in section 440.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes, to make clear that




In 1978, certain volunteers were excluded from the definition of
employee. s Those volunteers received the standard travel expenses
provided to salaried employees in the same agency, but no other
compensation. The new law states that if there are no salaried em-
ployees in the same agency, volunteers may receive the customary
travel expenses paid to salaried workers in the community. 4
3. Performers
The definition of employee also excludes independent contrac-
tors. In 1978, section 562.132, Florida Statutes, was added to the
80. Most ofthe following discussion concerns the changes made in the Workers Compen-
sation Act, ch. 440, Florida Statutes (1977 & Supp. 1978). In order for the process to be
complete, however, significant changes were made in the Insurance Code - primarily in ch.
627, Florida Statutes (1977 & Supp. 1978). These changes should be considered in assessing
the overall impact and significance of the 1979 amendments since each part of the system
was studied and all parts were affected. Note also that Part III will describe only the major
changes. Other changes will be noted briefly in footnotes. Still others will not be mentioned
at all. In order to form a coherent picture of the new system, both ch. 79-40 and ch. 79-312
should be read carefully in conjunction with those parts of ch. 440 which were not amended.
81. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1)(b)2 (Supp. 1978).
82. Ch. 79-40, § 2, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.02).
83. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(2)(d)3 (Supp. 1978).
84. Ch. 79-40, § 2, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.02).
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Beverage Law to include bands, orchestras, and musical and theat-
rical performers within the definition of independent contractor for
purposes of workers' compensation, provided that there is a written
contract evidencing such relationship.85 This provision was trans-
ferred from the Beverage Law to the Workers' Compensation Law,
since it made better sense to put the provision in the chapter to
which it applied.86
4. Subcontractors
The last 1979 amendment relating to exemptions provides that a
general contractor is responsible for workers' compensation only to
employees of a subcontractor with three or more employees.87 Pre-
viously, the general contractor was responsible for all employees of
a subcontractor who had not secured the payment of workers' com-
pensation to his employees.
One erroneous interpretation of this change is that if a subcon-
tractor has three or more employees but only two on a particular job,
those two are exempt from coverage since they do not become statu-
tory employees of the general contractor. Although it is true that the
general contractor would not have to cover these two employees,
obviously the subcontractor must provide coverage since he employs
three or more employees. As with so many other changes, the intent
in adding this provision about subcontractors is to reduce costs by
reducing the number of employees required to be covered.
C. Administrative Reforms-Executive Aspects
The Division of Workers' Compensation in the Department of
Labor and Employment Security is the agency of jurisdiction for the
act. Although the intent has always been to have a self-executing
system within the private sector, the high incidence of controverted
claims has defeated this intent. Reduction of litigation was one of
the primary goals of the new legislation. One way the 1979 amend-
ments addressed this problem was to make it clear that the Division
must "assume an active and forceful role" in the system. 8 The first
step taken was to elevate the agency from a bureau to a division .8
Although there is no single cause for the high level of litigation,
one important factor is the injured worker's uncertainty about his
rights, obligations and benefits. In a California study, 74% of the
85. (Supp. 1978).
86. Ch. 79-40, § 2, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.02).
87. Id. § 5 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.10).
88. Id. § 33 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.44).
89. Id.
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injured workers surveyed had no previous knowledge of workers'
compensation. Furthermore, three out of every four employees re-
ceived little or no information about workers' compensation from
the employer."0 The new law attempts to eliminate much of the
uncertainty by requiring much greater and quicker contact between
the Division and the injured employee.
Previously, the employer was required to report an injury to his
insurance carrier within seven days of actual knowledge.0 ' The car-
rier then had ten days within which to notify the Division."' The new
law eliminates this additional ten-day period by requiring the em-
ployer to report injuries directly to the Division within seven days
of actual knowledge. 3 The Division has prescribed a form for this
purpose. Copies of the completed form must also be provided by the
employer to the carrier and the injured employee. The back of the
employee's copy includes a summary of the rights, obligations and
benefits of injured workers under the act. Upon receipt of the injury
notice, the Division must immediately mail a more comprehensive
informational brochure to the injured worker. If it appears that the
injury will result in permanent impairment, the Division must then
contact the worker or a family representative who will assist the
worker. The Division had also been empowered to install additional
toll-free telephone lines to make the Division more accessible to
both workers and employers. 4 According to the telephone company,
the single line previously in operation could not handle the large
volume of incoming calls.
The 1979 amendments also provided the Division with a greatly
expanded role in controverted claims. Previously, the Division had
a virtual "hands-off" policy once a claim was contested. An insur-
ance carrier choosing to controvert a claim must now file with the
Division a written explanation setting forth in detail the reason or
reasons why the claim is controverted. Copies of this explanation
must also be sent to the employer and employee. 5 Furthermore,
once a claim is filed, the Division must now evaluate the claim to
determine if it can be resolved without a hearing and also, within
ten days after the claim is filed, issue an advisory opinion as to the
claimant's entitlement to benefits." Advisory opinions of the Divi-
90. CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSTITUTE, LITIGATION IN WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION: A REPORT TO THE INDusTRY 3 (undated).
91. FLA. STAT. § 440.185(2) (Supp. 1978).
92. Id. § 440.185(4).
93. Ch. 79-40, § 14, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.185).
94. Id. § 33 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.44).
95. Id. § 16 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.20).
96. Id. § 15 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.19).
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sion are specifically exempted from chapter 120.11 The Division
must notify all parties of its decision. However, this opinion is not
binding though it is deemed to be a part of any proceeding on the
claim.18 If a party chooses to respond to the Division, this response
must be included in the Division's case file on the claim.9
In addition to speeding up the notification of injury process and
increasing employee awareness of the system, the new law takes into
account claims handling practices of insurance carriers as a factor
which affects litigation. Section 16 of chapter 79-40 requires the
Division to examine its claims files on an ongoing basis in order to
identify questionable claims handling techniques, questionable pat-
terns of claims, or a pattern of repeated unreasonably controverted
claims by carriers, employers, or self-insurers. If the Division con-
cludes that such questionable techniques, patterns, or claims are
being utilized as a general business practice by the carrier, these
findings must then be certified by the Division to the Department
of Insurance for appropriate action. In addition, the Division must
publish an annual report which indicates the promptness of each
carrier and self-insurer with respect to the first payment of compen-
sation. The theory behind this provision is that late payments create
friction in the system and increase litigation. By publishing this
indicator of each insurer's claims handling ability, it is expected
that most insurers will try to improve their performance and thus
improve their standing in the report. This idea has been successfully
utilized in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. If the report indicates a
practice of late payment sufficient to constitute a general business
practice, the Department of Insurance, in the case of carriers, and
the Division, in the case of self-insurers, must take appropriate
action to halt such practice. However, the penalty for late payment
of any installment of any compensation was reduced from 20% of
the unpaid installment to 10%. This penalty is also now labelled
"punitive" in order to prevent such penalties from being deducted
as a business expense for federal income tax purposes.
Section 25 of chapter 79-40 contains another provision which was
adopted to encourage prompt and efficient claims handling by in-
surers. All carriers must now maintain a claims adjuster, either in-
house or under contract, situated within the State of Florida.
. Hospitals and doctors received $126,474,207 from workers' com-
pensation cases in 1978. This accounted for 44% of all benefits paid
97. Id. § 3 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.021).
98. Id. § 15 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.19).
99. Ch. 79-312, § 11, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.19).
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by carriers and self-insurers.'0 A study of claims closed in 1977 in
Florida, Wisconsin, and Alabama showed that of these three states,
Florida had the highest percentage of medical specialist involve-
ment, greatest extent of hospital confinement, highest average hos-
pital bill, and highest level of medical practitioner involvement.','
Consideration of these factors led to two important health care cost
containment provisions. The main provision relating to health care
cost containment in the new law is the medical utilization and peer
review requirement. 0 2 This provision instructs the Division to de-
velop and implement, or to contract with a qualified entity to de-
velop and implement, utilization review of health care services ren-
dered in workers' compensation cases. This review includes the ap-
propriateness of both the level and quality of the services. Instances
of possible inappropriate utilization are referred to the Division.
The Division then determines whether the information referred to
it warrants further study by the peer review committee. Peer review
is provided by a private nonprofit medical foundation under con-
tract with the Division. The peer review committee must submit a
report and recommendations to the Division. If it is determined that
a health care provider improperly overutilized or otherwise rendered
or ordered inappropriate medical treatment or services, or that the
cost of such treatment or services was inappropriate, the Division
may order the health care provider to show cause why it should not
be required to repay the amount paid for such treatment or services.
It is only at this point that the right to an administrative hearing
under section 120.57, Florida Statutes, arises.0 3 The procedures,
reports and recommendations of utilization review and peer review
are not subject to the provisions of chapter 120.
The second health care cost containment provision is also in sec-
tion 8 of chapter 79-40. Under previous law, the Division adopted
maximum fee schedules for both physicians and hospitals. In some
cases, these schedules resulted in physicians and hospitals charging
the maximum fee even though they normally charged less. The
change in the law states that an individual health care provider
shall be paid either his usual and customary charge or the maxi-
mum charge, whichever is less.'0 With respect to hospitals, the new
100. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, ANNUAL REPORT 1978 at
13 (1978).
101. National Council on Compensation Ins., Workmen's Compensation Resolved Claim
Study 2 (1977) (survey available at the House Insurance Committee, 310 House Office Build-
ing, Tallahassee, Fla. 32304).
102. Ch. 79-40, § 8, 1979 Fla. Laws 215, as amended by ch. 79-312, § 7, 1979 Fla. Laws
1645 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.13).
103. (Supp. 1978).
104. Ch. 79-40, § 8, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.13). The
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law is that a hospital shall be paid the lowest charge currently
assessed for such treatment or service in the community in which
the hospital is located. 05
D. Administration-Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Aspects
The judicial and quasi-judicial aspects of the system were also
substantially changed by the new law. The most visible change is
the abolition of the Industrial Relations Commission,'" effective
October 1, 1979.107 This step was recommended by the Commission
on the Florida Appellate Court Structure which was appointed by
Chief Justice England of the Florida Supreme Court. This recom-
mendation was accepted by Chief Justice England and also by the
Board of Governors of the Florida Bar.0 8 The Commission's recom-
mendation was made as part of its program to alleviate the growing
caseload and backlog in the judicial system.
With the abolition of the Industrial Relations Commission, the
new law provides a right of appeal from orders of the deputy com-
missioners to the First District Court of Appeal' 09 beginning October
1, 1979."" This is contrary to the Appellate Court Structure Com-
mission recommendation that appeals be to all of the district courts
rather than to only one. There are several reasons for limiting ap-
peals to the First District. Since the inception of the Industrial
Relations Commission, workers' compensation appeals have been
heard only in Tallahassee."' Splitting the cases among the district
courts now would likely result in conflicts among their decisions.
More important perhaps is the fact that the First District, com-
pletely inexperienced in workers' compensation law, can draw upon
the staff of the Industrial Relations Commission to provide the
needed expertise. Also, the entire administrative system and physi-
cal assets of the Industrial Relations Commission are in Tallahas-
see. This system can easily be transferred to the First District Court
of Appeal and has legally been so transferred by section 1 of chapter
maximum charge in this instance clearly refers to the schedule adopted by the Division. The
word "maximum" was inserted in the 1979 bill to require the Division to "adopt schedules
of maximum charges."
105. Id.
106. Id. § 46.
107. Ch. 79-312, § 1, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645.
108. Florida Bar News, Apr. 25, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
109. Ch. 79-40, § 46, 1979 Fla. Laws 215.
110. Ch. 79-312, § 1, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645.
111. Ch. 17481, § 44, 1935 Fla. Laws 1456 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.01 (Supp.
1978)). The original act created the Florida Industrial Commission and mandated that it have
offices in Tallahassee. Id. As part of the Governmental Reorganization Act of 1969, the
Florida Industrial Commission became the Industrial Relations Commission. Ch. 69-106, §
17, 1969 Fla. Laws 490 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.44 (Supp. 1978)).
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79-312. In order to implement this provision, the First District also
received two additional judges"' and an additional appropriation of
$2,292,673."1
3
The judges of industrial claims have been renamed deputy com-
missioners," 4 which is what they were called prior to 1967." '1 The
title "judge of industrial claims" is inaccurate since the initial level
of hearings on a workers' compensation claim is not a trial court,
although the Florida Supreme Court has indicated that this process
is quasi-judicial.I' s It may also be true that an injured worker is more
inclined to feel the need for an attorney in a hearing before a judge
than before a deputy commissioner. The present judges of industrial
claims were retained in office under their new title."'
A new position, the Chief Commissioner, was created by the new
law."' Chapter 79-312 makes it clear that the Chief Commissioner
must be an attorney, with three years experience in the practice of
law in Florida."' This is the same qualification required for deputy
commissioners. The Chief Commissioner is responsible for acting as
liaison between the deputy commissioners and the Division of
Workers' Compensation, the courts, the Florida Bar, the Workers'
Compensation Advisory Council, and the Secretary of Labor and
Employment Security. Additional responsibilities assigned to this
position include training and orientation of new deputy commis-
sioners, case assignments, and insuring effective administration by
the deputy commissioners. The Chief Commissioner may also serve
as pro haec vice deputy commissioner. The Governor is responsible
for appointing the Chief Commissioner; nomination by the Judicial
Nominating Commission is not necessary.11°
The primary reason for the creation of this position was to provide
a full-time administrator to develop efficient, effective and coordi-
nated efforts by the deputy commissioners. Previously, the judges
of industrial claims were virtually independent, with very little co-
ordination among themselves or with other aspects of the system.
Although technically the judges were part of the Bureau of Work-
men's Compensation, the only contact between the two was in the
areas of budget and physical facilities. Case assignments, for the
112. Ch. 79-312, § 3, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 35.06).
113. Id. § 4.
114. Ch. 79-40, § 35, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.45).
115. Ch. 67-554, § 2, 1967 Fla. Laws 1650 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.45 (Supp.
1978)).
116. Scholastic Systems v. LeLoup, 307 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974).
117. Ch. 79-312, § 2, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645.
118. Ch. 79-40, § 35, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.45).
119. Ch. 79-312, § 19, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.45).
120. Ch. 79-40, § 35, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.45).
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twenty-six judges were handled by the Senior Judge, who was also
responsible for his own caseload. The Chief Commissioner replaces
the Senior Judge for administrative purposes and provides the at-
tention that is needed in this aspect of the system. However, it is
clear that the Chief Commissioner has no power with respect to the
decisions made by the deputy commissioners on the cases they han-
dle.
Several procedural changes were made with respect to claim filing
and hearings. During the course of legislative hearings, "shotgun"
claims were frequently identified as a major problem. A shotgun
claim is a form pleading which simply states that the injured worker
claims all benefits to which he is entitled under the workers' com-
pensation law. This form typically lists all of the types of benefits
available under the law but does not specify the type of disability,
extent of disability, or amount of compensation claimed. Such
claims could previously be filed after the first seven days of disabil-
ity. 2 ' Under the new law, a claim can be filed only after a specific
benefit becomes due and is not paid. 122 The claim must state the
specific compensation benefit which is due but has not been paid
or is not being provided. Any claim which is not in compliance is
subject to dismissal upon the motion of any interested party, the
Division, or the deputy commissioners. The application for a hear-
ing on a claim must concisely state the reasons for requesting a
hearing and the questions at issue or in dispute. 2 3 Under prior law,
there were no statutory requirements for the contents of such re-
quests. In addition, in order to prevent a large backlog, hearings
must now be held within ninety days after a request is filed.'
4
The statute of limitations on claims for medical benefits has been
consolidated with the statute of limitations on claims for disability,
impairment, and wage loss benefits. The only substantive change is
that no statute of limitations shall apply to the right for remedial
attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic
device to any part of the body.'2
E. Benefit Changes
Workers' compensation benefits can be evaluated by using the
criteria that benefits should be adequate and equitable, and effi-
ciently provided.' 2 The efficiency of the delivery system was ad-
121. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(1) (Supp. 1978).
122. Ch. 79-40, § 19, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.25).
123. Id. § 15 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.19).
124. Id. § 19 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.25).
125. Id. § 15 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.19).
126. J. Burton & W. Vroman, supra note 77, at 15-21.
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dressed by the administrative reforms discussed in Parts C. and D.
above. Adequacy and equity were addressed in the new law by sub-
stantial changes in the benefit structure. Judged by these two fac-
tors, Florida's old system of scheduled injuries, impairment ratings,
and loss of wage earning capacity was a failure. Adequate benefits
should provide substantial protection against interruption of in-
come. Workers' compensation benefits should be based on loss of
income rather than economic need since workers' compensation is
an insurance program rather than a welfare program. To provide
more adequate benefits, the maximum weekly benefit has been in-
creased by the new law from 66 2/3% to 100% of the statewide
average weekly wage.' This change raised the maximum weekly
benefit from $130 to $195 per week. The statewide average weekly
wage is revised annually based on the year ending June 30, and the
maximum benefit is adjusted accordingly. 18 The new law also raised
the benefits for each particular category of injury so that the benefit
or the benefit plus any earnings equal at least 66 2/3% of the injured
worker's preinjury gross weekly wages, as recommended by the Na-
tional Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws.
2 9
Equity means that workers with equal losses of earnings or earn-
ing capacity should receive equal disability benefits and workers
with equally serious impairments should receive equal impairment
benefits. However, the measurement both of loss of wage earning
capacity and of degree of impairment is inherently difficult and
certain to result in inequities. "One problem is that the measure-
ment of impairment is at best controversial and at worst almost
impossible." 130 Additionally, the controversy inherent in determina-
tions of wage earning capacity and impairment ratings present seri-
ous efficiency problems. Thus the new law embraces actual wage
loss as the basis of compensation in order to promote the goals of
adequacy, equity, and efficiency.
1. Permanent Partial Disability
The term "permanent partial disability" has been eliminated in
the new law. The act now refers to "permanent impairment and
wage-loss benefits" instead. Impairment benefits will now be paid
only for "permanent impairment due to amputation, loss of 80 per-
cent or more of vision, after correction, or serious facial or head
disfigurement resulting from an injury other than an injury entitling
127. Ch. 79-40, § 7, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.12).
128. FLA. STAT. § 440.12 (Supp. 1978).
129. THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
(July 1972).
130. J. Burton & W. Vromnan, supra note 77, at 19.
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the injured worker to permanent total disability benefits. 31 The
amount of the impairment benefit is $50 for each percent of perma-
nent impairment of the body as a whole from 1% through 50% and
$100 for each percent of permanent impairment of the body as a
whole for that portion in excess of 50%. The Division must establish
by rule a schedule for use in determining the existence and degree
of any permanent impairment. Until such schedule is adopted, the
temporary guidelines are the Guides to the Evaluation of Perma-
nent Impairment which were developed by the American Medical
Association. If an injured worker is eligible to receive an impairment
benefit, the benefit is due and payable within twenty days after the
carrier has knowledge of the impairment.
In addition to any impairment benefit, a worker with a permanent
partial impairment will receive wage-loss compensation if his actual
wages are reduced by more than 15% after maximum medical im-
provement. 32 The new law clearly states that such compensation is
to be based on actual wage loss. The only exception is that in the
event an employee voluntarily limits his or her income, or fails to
accept employment commensurate with his or her abilities, the
wage-loss compensation would be based on the amount which the
employee could have earned. In no case can the compensation be
based on less than the employee's actual earnings.
The amount of the compensation is equal to 95% of the difference
between 85% of the employee's preinjury average monthly wage and
the employee's post-maximum medical improvement wage. 133 The
compensation itself cannot exceed 66 2/3% of the preinjury average
monthly wage. This cap becomes operative only when a worker's
wage loss exceeds 85% of his preinjury wages. Since the cap coin-
cides with the higher compensation paid under the new law for
permanent total, temporary total, and temporary partial disabili-
ties, the compensation for a worker whose wage loss is greater than
131. Ch. 79-40, § 10, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15).
132. Id. The initial eligibility requirement for wage-loss benefits is the existence of a
permanent impairment "determined pursuant to the schedule." Id. The schedule referred to
is the schedule which the Division is required to adopt for use in "determining the existence
and degree of permanent impairment." Id. For the purposes of wage-loss benefits, the sched-
ule is thus to be used in determining the existence of a permanent impairment. The degree
of impairment is irrelevant to the issue of wage loss.
133. Id. Unfortunately, an attempt has been made by the opponents of the new law to
interpret the wage-loss formula in two different ways. The so-called second interpretation is
not an interpretation at all but a totally erroneous reading of the English language. It is
amazingly illogical to read the plain words of the law to require calculating preinjury wages
minus postinjury wages, multiplied by 85%, and then multiplied again by 95%. Why not
simply multiply by 80.75%? Furthermore, this intentional misstatement of the formula pat-
ently ignores the clear legislative intent which is repeatedly documented in the files and tapes
of the House Committee on Insurance and the Senate Committee on Commerce.
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85% is the same as that for total disability. Compensation under the
previous law, for all categories of disability, was 60% of the em-
ployee's average weekly wage.
For a simple illustration of the wage-loss formula, take the exam-
ple of a worker whose preinjury average monthly wage was $1,000
and whose post-maximum medical improvement average monthly
wage is $750. Eighty-five percent of the preinjury wage of $1,000 is
$850. Subtracting the post-maximum medical improvement wage of
$750 from $850 equals $100. The compensation thus equals 95% of
$100, or $95. The Division has prescribed a form for reporting wage
loss by the employee to the carrier which contains this simple step-
by-step method of computing the wage-loss compensation. This
form must be completed for each month in which there is compensa-
ble wage loss, then signed by both employer and employee, and
delivered to the carrier. Upon receipt of this form, the carrier has
fourteen days within which to make the payment'' or twenty-one
days within which to controvert the claim.' 5 If the carrier contro-
verts the claim, the burden is on the employee to prove that the
wage loss resulted from the injury.'36
The carrier is also responsible for furnishing the employee with
the Request for Wage-Loss Benefits form.'37 Benefits are paid
monthly, up to a maximum of 350 weeks or age 65, for injuries
occurring prior to July 1, 1980, and up to 525 weeks or age 65, for
injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1980. The right to wage-loss
benefits also terminates at the end of any two-year period after the
month in which maximum medical improvement is attained unless
wage-loss benefits have been payable during at least three consecu-
tive months of this period.' 3 Beginning with the twenty-fifth month
after maximum medical improvement, the employee's actual wages
will be discounted for inflation before the benefit is calculated.' 39
The discount rate is 3% compounded annually, for injuries occurring
prior to July 1, 1980. For injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1980,
the discount rate will be 5%, compounded annually.
134. Id. § 14 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.17), provides that the Division shall adopt
such a form. The form is available from the Division of Workers' Compensation, A.shley
Building, Koger Executive Center, Tallahassee, Fla. 32301.
135. Id. § 16 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.20).
136. Id. § 10 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15).
137. Rule 38 FER 79-3.18 (Emergency Rule of Fla. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec.,
Div. of Workers' Comp.).
138. Ch. 79-40, § 10, 1979 Fla. Law 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15).
139. Id. This section states that the discount factor is to apply to all injuries occurring
on or after July 1, 1979. This date should have been changed by ch. 79-312 to August 1, 1979,
as the effective date was changed. But, since the act itself applies only to injuries occurring
on or after the effective date of the law, August 1, 1979, the discount factor should apply only
to injuries occurring on or after August 1, 1979.
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The effect of discounting is both to increase the monthly benefit
and extend the number of months in which the employee will re-
ceive benefits. For example, if an employee returns to work with a
25% wage loss but receives an annual cost-of-living increase of 6%,
he would be below the 15% wage loss threshold after the second year.
Due only to inflation, he would have been kicked out of the compen-
sation system although it may be that he is unable to obtain better
employment or increase his earnings on his own merit due to his
permanent impairment. By using the discount factor, this em-
ployee's wage loss, for purposes of calculating the benefit, will again
exceed the 15% threshold.
2. Temporary Partial Disability
Compensation for temporary partial disability has also been
changed to the wage-loss system. Under prior law, such compensa-
tion consisted of 60% of the difference between the injured em-
ployee's preinjury average weekly wage and his wage earning capac-
ity after the injury."10 This was amended by chapter 79-40 to simply
provide for a comparison with actual wages rather than wage earn-
ing capacity and then compensate the worker at the rate of 66 2/3%
of the difference, rather than 60%."1 However, this section was fur-
ther amended by chapter 79-312 so that temporary partial disability
compensation is calculated using the same formula. 4 1 If this change
had not been made, an injured worker with an actual wage loss of
50% or less would receive higher benefits if classified as temporary
partial rather than as permanent partial. A point of friction would
then have existed in the system as injured workers attempted to
obtain or remain classified with a temporary partial disability. In
addition, there is no logical reason for the compensation for these
two classes of disability to be different. The difference between the
two is that a worker who is partially disabled receives temporary
partial compensation prior to maximum medical improvement.
After maximum medical improvement, the worker either is no
longer disabled or is permanently partially disabled.
As in the case of permanent partial compensation, the basis of
temporary partial compensation is actual wage loss, unless the em-
ployee voluntarily limits his or her income or fails to accept employ-
ment commensurate with his or her ability. The compensation can
in no case be based on less than the actual earnings of the worker.
The amount of the monthly compensation cannot exceed 66 2/3%
140. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(4) (Supp. 1978).
141. Ch. 79-40, § 10, 1979 Fla. Laws 215.
142. Ch. 79-312, § 8, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15).
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of the worker's preinjury average monthly wages. Temporary partial
benefits can be paid for up to five years. The termination periods
and discounting factor which are contained in the permanent par-
tial provisions do not apply to temporary partial disabilities.
3. Permanent Total Disability
For permanent total disability, prior law provided compensation
in the amount of 60% of the employee's average weekly wages for
the continuance of the disability."' The new law raised this compen-
sation rate to 66 2/3% of the employee's average weekly wages. In
cases involving double amputations, loss of eyes, or, under the new
law, paraplegia, or quadriplegia, permanent total disability is pre-
sumed unless there is conclusive proof of a substantial earning ca-
pacity. With respect to all other disabilities, an injured worker can-
not be classified as permanently totally disabled under the new law
if he or she is engaged in, or is physically capable of engaging in,
gainful employment. If an insurance carrier controverts a perma-
nent total claim in these other cases, the burden is on the employee
to establish that he or she is not able uninterruptedly to do even
light work due to physical limitation. If an injured worker who is
receiving permanent total disability compensation establishes an
earning capacity, the worker will then receive wage loss benefits
according to the provisions of sections 440.15(3) (a) and (b). The new
law requires the Division to adopt rules to enable a permanently
totally disabled worker to undertake a trial period of reemployment
without prejudicing his return to permanent total status in the
event that the worker is unable to sustain an earning capacity.' 4'
4. Temporary Total Disability
Compensation for temporary total disability remains the same
under the new law except for the amount of compensation which has
been increased from 60% to 66 2/3% of the employee's average
weekly wages.
F. Lump-Sum Payment of Compensation
The old law provides for the release of an employer's liability
upon the payment of a lump-sum settlement to the injured
worker."' This procedure is commonly called a "washout" because
it terminates the rights and liabilities of the employer and employee
143. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(1) (Supp. 1978).
144. Ch. 79-40, § 10, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15).
145. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(10) (Supp. 1978).
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under the act. Just as it was illogical to base compensation upon
prospective wage earning capacity under the prior law, it is illogical
to pay a lump-sum benefit shortly after an injury has occurred when
the future effects of the injury are unknown. At least one study has
indicated that this procedure too often results in overpayment of
claims and payment of unjustified claims.'46 It may also result in
underpayment for the most serious injuries, particularly since a
washout terminates the injured worker's right to future medical
benefits. Proceeding on the theory that workers' compensation is
intended to supplement the lost wages of an injured worker, the new
law states that, as a matter of public policy, it is in the best interests
of an injured worker to receive disability payments on a periodic
basis. Washout of future medical benefits is prohibited. Washout of
other benefits is permitted only in special circumstances, as when
the claimant can demonstrate that a lump-sum payment will defi-
nitely aid in his or her rehabilitation or is otherwise clearly in his
or her best interests and that lump-sum payment will avoid undue
expense or undue hardship to any party. In addition, an employer
now has the statutory right to appear at any washout hearing. The
carrier must give reasonable notice to the employer of the time and
date of the hearing and inform him of his right to appear and testify.
Finally, a washout is entirely prohibited until at least six months
after the injured employee reaches maximum medical improve-
ment.'47 However, the clear legislative intent of the new law is vir-
tually to eliminate washout settlements except for a few rare and
unusual cases. The use of washouts in wage loss cases would contra-
dict the very basis of the system; that is, the payment of compensa-
tion based on known economic loss rather than the payment based
on speculative future losses.
G. Merger, Apportionment and the Second Injury Fund
There are three provisions in chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes,
dealing with the situation in which a worker who has a preexisting
physical impairment is injured on the job. 148 These provisions deal
with merger, apportionment, and the second injury fund.
Under the old law, a merger resulted when, because of a preexist-
ing impairment, a greater permanent disability resulted than the
second accident would have caused when considered by itself. In
that case, any amounts previously received by the worker under the
146. AssocLATED INDUSTRIES OF FLORIDA, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: "PERMANENT PARTIAL
DIsABILrY STuDy" OF CLOSED FILES OF CLA S FILED IN FLORIDA DRUING CALENDAR YEAR 1977,
at 5-10 (1979).
147. Ch. 79-40, § 16, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.20).
148. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.02(18), .15(5), .49(5) (Supp. 1978).
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Florida act were to be deducted from the new award'49 or the new
award was to be reduced by that percentage of the disability attrib-
utable to the preexisting impairment.'10 The purpose was to prevent
double payments by excluding the amounts already paid or the
disability resulting from the preexisting impairment. The new law
does not change this situation with regard to impairment benefits, 5'
although the impairment benefits available have themselves been
changed significantly. The new material in section 440.15(5), Flor-
ida Statutes, concerns the wage-loss benefits payable for subsequent
injury."' The new subsections (c) and (d) of section 440.15(5) pro-
vide that both temporary disability benefits and any wage-loss ben-
efits already being received will be paid, and that any wage loss
caused by the subsequent injury will be paid in addition to any wage
loss previously payable. 53 These subsections recognize that the
"preinjury wage" in the wage-loss context where a previous injury
was involved already reflects the effects of the previous injury so
that no additional apportionment is necessary.
The apportionment section under the old law was found in section
440.02(18), Florida Statutes.'" The new section 440.02(18) has been
amended to refer only to acceleration of death.5 5 The "aggravation
or acceleration" language relating to an existing disability has been
deleted. 6
The second injury fund was established to encourage the employ-
ment of people with impairments by limiting employer liability for
subsequent injuries through reimbursement from the fund.'57 Under
the old law, an employer had to meet two requirements before he
could be reimbursed. He had to show knowledge of the preexisting
condition before the subsequent injury occurred and he had to have
at least $3,000 of expenses before any reimbursement would occur.5 ,
The new law changes the limitation of liability section in three
ways. First, section 440.49(5), Florida Statutes, 59 is amended to
include references to permanent impairments and wage loss.160 Sec-
ond, the reimbursement for permanent partial disability is no longer
the last 60% of all compensation provided but rather 60% of impair-
149. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(c) (Supp. 1978).
150. Id. § 440.02(18).
151. Ch. 79-40, § 10, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FiA. STAT. § 440.15).
152. (Supp. 1978).
153. Ch. 79-40, § 10, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15).
154. (Supp. 1978).
155. Ch. 79-40, § 2, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.02).
156. Id. § 10 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.02).
157. FLA. STAT. § 440.49(5)(a) (Supp. 1978).
158. Id. § 440.49(5)(f)1.
159. (Supp. 1978).
160. Ch. 79-40, § 37, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.49).
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ment benefits provided. If there is a wage loss, whether or not im-
pairment benefits are payable, the employer will be reimbursed for
60% of all compensation for wage loss paid for the first five years
after maximum medical improvement and 75% for all wage-loss
compensation paid thereafter. Finally, though the requirement of
prior employer knowledge still acts as a limitation on reimburse-
ment, the $3,000 limitation has been deleted.
One other change should be noted. The last sentence in section
440.02(18), Florida Statutes,' providing that compensation for
temporary disability and medical benefits shall not be subject to
apportionment, has been transferred to new section 440.15(5)(a),
since it seemed to make better sense to have it in the latter section
than in the section defining "accidents." '
In summary, the new section 440.15(5)(b) addresses both appor-
tionment and merger." 3 When a compensable permanent impair-
ment results from the acceleration or aggravation of a preexisting
condition, then the employee will receive the benefits to which he
is entitled for the impairment resulting from the accident alone, but
the employer may still be entitled to reimbursement from the Spe-
cial Disability Trust Fund if the resulting disability is greater than
would have existed but for the preexisting condition pursuant to
new section 440.49(7)(f)3.111
H. Coercion of Employees
At the hearings conducted by the House Insurance Committee
before the 1979 session began, claimants' attorneys noted that their
clients often reported harassment and firings or threatened firings
if a claim were filed. The 1979 amendments addressed this problem
by creating a new section in chapter 440.161 Section 440.205 prohibits
an employer from discharging, threatening to discharge, intimidat-
ing or coercing any employee because of the employee's claim for
compensation.
I. Attorney's Fees
Since one of the reasons for the changes made in 1979 was the
large amount of litigation, attorney's fees came under intense scru-
tiny. Prior to 1978, a successful claimant could recover 100% of his
161. (Supp. 1978).
162. Ch. 79-40, §§ 2, 10, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15).
163. Id. § 10 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15).
164. Id. § 37 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.49).
165. Id. § 17 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.205).
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attorney's fees.' 6 Then in 1978, section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes,
was amended to require the claimant to pay 25% of the fees on
claims for benefits other than medical benefits, with the remaining
75% still paid by the carrier or employer.' 7 This was an attempt to
reduce litigation. Whether a 25% reduction would have had a signif-
icant effect is now academic.
The new law requires the claimant to pay 100% of his attorney's
fees on all claims for benefits except if the claim is for medical
benefits only and does not include a claim for disability, permanent
impairment, or wage-loss benefits; or if the carrier has acted in bad
faith in handling a claim and the injured worker has suffered an
economic loss; or if the employer or carrier denies that a compensa-
ble injury occurred and the claimant prevails on the issue of com-
pensability.'
6 8
Chapter 79-312 changed the provisions of chapter 79-40 primarily
by clarifying the language in the first bill in three ways. The phrase
"except as provided by this subsection," was added to subsection
(1) to make clear that the deputy commissioner need not adhere
strictly to the formula but may take other factors into consideration
either to increase or decrease the award.'69 These are the same fac-
tors which were added to chapter 440 in 1977.70
The other two clarifications occur in subsection (2). The first was
made to make it perfectly clear that the employer or carrier would
have to pay 100% of the attorney's fee on medical benefits only. The
second changed the word "coverage" to "compensability" because
the former was inappropriate."'
Chapter 79-312 did make a substantive change. Previous law had
contained a provision making it a misdemeanor to receive a fee
which has not been approved by the deputy commissioner or to
solicit compensation claims.'7 1 Chapter 79-40 had not retained this
provision when the language of the section was sustantially re-
worded. 7 1 Chapter 79-312 reenacted that provision. 7
166. Ch. 20672, § 11, 1941 Fla. Laws 1691 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.34(1) (Supp.
1978)).
167. Ch. 78-300, § 10, 1978 Fla. Laws 847 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.34(1) (Supp.
1978)).
168. Ch. 79-40, § 27, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.34).
169. Ch. 79-312, § 15, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.34).
170. Ch. 77-290, § 9, 1977 Fla. Laws 1284 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.34(1) (Supp.
1978)).
171. Ch. 79-312, § 15, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.34).
172. Ch. 17481, § 34, 1935 Fla. Laws 1456 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.34(5) (Supp.
1978)). The misdemeanor was made one of the second degree in 1971. Ch. 71-136, § 365, 1971
Fla. Laws 552 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.34(5) (Supp. 1978)).
173. Ch. 79-40, § 27, 1979 Fla. Laws 215.
174. Ch. 79-312. § 15. 1979 Fla. Laws 1645 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.34).
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J. Self-Insurance
The old law permitted an employer to self-insure and provided
that the division may set the requirements.' During the months of
hearings preceding the 1979 session, the members of the House In-
surance Committee heard a great deal of testimony about the 25%
of the employers in the state who have found self-insurance to be
less costly than insurance purchased on the commercial market. " ,
The new law provides another way for employers to become self-
insured, adds several provisions designed to ensure the financial
integrity of the self-insured, and adds several other provisions to
more nearly equalize the treatment of the self-insured and those
employers insured under commercial policies.
Chapter 79-40 changed the permissive "may" to the mandatory
"shall" to require the Division to adopt rules to permit two or more
employers to qualify as a group self-insurer's fund."7 The intent was
to permit smaller employers to self-insure more readily.
There were several provisions addressed to financial integrity.
Section 440.57, Florida Statutes, was amended to require the Divi-
sion to adopt rules requiring self-insurers to maintain monetary
reserves, and governing their organization and operation to ensure
compliance.1 In addition, self-insurers, except for state or local
governmental entities, are now required to carry reinsurance. 79 The
provisions of the Joint Underwriting Association were substantially
changed. One of the changes requires self-insurers to participate in
the apportionment among insurers of losses and loss adjustment
expenses as of July 1, 1981. This does not apply to governmental
entities, nor does it apply to public utilities."" Another provision
creates a guaranty fund in the State Treasury for individual self-
insurers and for all group self-insurers except governmental entities
and public utilities."' The final provision concerning financial in-
tegrity requires the Division to adopt rules requiring self-insurers to
file the necessary reports.' 2
175. FLA. STAT. § 440.38(1)(b) (Supp. 1978).
176. Materials and tapes of the meetings are available from the Committee Secretary,
House Insurance Committee, 310 House Office Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304. See,
e.g., Testimony of Employers, meeting of Jan. 31, 1979, on file with the Committee.
177. Ch. 79-40, § 43, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.57).
178. (Supp. 1978).
179. Ch. 79-40, § 43, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.57).
180. Ch. 79-40, § 107, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.311).
181. Ch. 79-312, § 16, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.38). Ch. 79-
40, § 29, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.38), also provided for the
creation of a fund, but the creation was to have been accomplished by the division by January
31, 1980. Chapter 79-312 creates the fund on the effective date of the act and provides that
the division shall have rules adopted by July 1, 1980, when the fund is to become effective.
182. Ch. 79-40, § 29, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.38).
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The other changes made in the 1979 session are directed at requir-
ing self-insurers to be treated the same as employers insured under
commercial policies. The first change includes self-insurers with
other employers and carriers subject to Division scrutiny in the area
of questionable claims handling.'1 The second requires self-
insurers, along with other carriers, to provide safety consultations
to their policyholders.84 The third provision requires employers to
prove to the Division, before they are permitted to self-insure, that
they have sufficient "competent personnel" to handle claims and
safety management. 5
While some of these changes were probably originally suggested
with the hope that they would restrict the expansion of the share of
the market covered by self-insurance, they were adopted with the




The 1979 amendments were almost exclusively concerned with
vocational rehabilitation since physical rehabilitation is part of the
remedial treatment the employer must furnish to the injured em-
ployee pursuant to section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes. 7 Testimony
at the hearings held by the House Insurance Committee indicated
that the premiums paid by employers include a percentage for voca-
tional rehabilitation.' This is so even though a specific percentage
is not broken out in the rate filings.'
Section 440.49, Florida Statutes, was substantially changed to
require the employer and carrier to provide rehabilitation services
and to report the employee's progress to the Division periodically. 0
The Division may also entertain requests for such services and, after
a hearing, require them to be provided. The rehabilitation period
has been reduced from forty weeks to twenty-six weeks, but with the
possibility of another twenty-six weeks, or an even longer voluntary
extension. Temporary disability benefits may be paid during reha-
bilitation. 9'
183. Id. § 16, (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.20).
184. Id. § 42 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.56).
185. Id. § 29 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.38).
186. This latter was true because the Division of Workers' Compensation rather than the
Department of Insurance is charged with supervising self-insurers. The Division's experience
with insurance requirements is necessarily more restricted than that of the Department.
187. (Supp. 1978).
188. Testimony of Insurance Carriers (Jan. 31, 1979) (tape available from the Committee
Secretary, House Insurance Committee, 310 House Office Building, Tallahassee, Fla. 32304).
189. Id., Testimony of Mark Trafton, Actuary for the Florida Insurance Department.
190. (Supp. 1978).
191. Ch. 79-40, § 37, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.49).
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While it is not possible to quantify the cost reductions, it seems
obvious that a rehabilitated person returned to some form of gainful
employment is just that much less of a drain on the workers' com-
pensation system.
L. Safety Management
Section 440.56, Florida Statutes, permits the Division to conduct
safety inspections and prescribe safety standards "in every employ-
ment or place of employment.""' The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) has preempted the private sector
for enforcement purposes so that the Division presently provides
safety consultations to private employers only on request.
As with rehabilitation, the insurance carriers testified that a per-
centage of the premiums charged to employers is used to provide
safety management for their policyholders." 3 Given the OSHA
preemption, the legislature decided to make the carriers specifically
responsible for safety.
The new law requires carriers to provide safety consultations to
each policyholder requesting one and to report to the Division an-
nually on their programs. The Division will remain responsible for
its present activities and in addition will develop guidelines for
safety programs and may approve programs submitted to it."'
The cost effect of increased safety measures is not quantifiable
but it stands to reason that fewer accidents mean lower costs.
M. Ratemaking
In addition to all the other interested parties affected by the 1979
amendments, the insurance carriers had their share of scrutiny. It
seemed obvious that the more the legislature and the Department
of Insurance knew about the process of ratemaking, the more control
could be exercised over that group which actually decided what the
premiums would be. Suggestions for ways to better understand and
regulate the ratemaking process were forthcoming from a variety of
sources.
1. Mandatory Rate Reduction
The legislature's intent in beginning this massive reworking of the
Workers' Compensation Act was both to halt the steady increase in
premium rates and to reduce the rates immediately if possible. A
192. (Supp. 1978).
193. Testimony of Insurance Carriers, supra note 217.
194. Ch. 79-40, § 42, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.56).
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number of actuaries were involved throughout the process and none
of them could agree entirely about the cost effects of the changes
made. The independent actuary hired as a consultant to the House
Insurance Committee, Dr. Lena Chang, estimated that the effect of
the changes as finally enacted would be a reduction in rates of
17.3%.18 Based on her report, the legislature mandated a rate reduc-
tion of 15% on the effective date of the act,' and also mandated a
rate filing no later than fifteen days after the act became law to
reflect this reduction. 97
2. Data Reporting, Methodology and the Rating Bureau
Of course, even though the legislature has the power to mandate
reductions, the exercise of the power is futile if those charged with
regulating the insurance industry do not have the data, the method-
ology or the personnel with which to make an informed, independ-
ent assessment of the material submitted by the industry.'"8
To aid the Department of Insurance in collecting data, the legisla-
ture amended section 624.435, Florida Statutes,' to provide that
data reported to the department annually be broken down into
forms more amenable to analysis by the department's staff.00
Dr. Chang proposed a discounting methodology to be used by the
Department of Insurance in its rate determinations .20 This method
recognizes the well-known phenomenon that in order to pay X dol-
lars in ten years, one need invest less than X dollars today. The
discounting factors used reflect the length of time over which the
money will be paid out. Thus, operating expenses are paid out
sooner than claims so that expenses will have a lower discounting
factor than claims. The actual pay-out pattern is readily deter-
mined through statistical analysis of accumulated data. The factors
195. L. Chang, Costing the New Florida Workers' Compensation Law 3 (June 1979) (on
file with the House Insurance Committee, 310 House Office Building, Tallahassee, Fla.
32304).
196. Ch. 79-40, § 125, 1979 Fla. Laws 215.
197. Ch. 79-312, § 22, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645.
198. FLA. STAT. § 627.091 (Supp. 1978) requires every insurance carrier to file its rates with
the Insurance Department. Since there are about 250 separate carriers writing compensation
coverage in Florida, separate filings would be burdensome on both the carriers and the
Department. Subsection (4) of § 627.091 permits the carriers to join a rating organization
which in turn would make one filing covering all carriers. The organization chosen by the
Florida carriers to perform this task is the National Council on Compensation Insurance (One
Penn Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10001) which also serves about 30 other states in the country.
199. (Supp. 1978).
200. Ch. 79-40, § 81, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 624.435).
201. Id. § 94 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.072).
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used are therefore accurate within very narrow ranges of devia-
tion .202
The amendment to section 627.072, Florida Statutes, 20 3 does not
require the Department of Insurance to use this methodology but
does require that if the Commissioner decides not to use it, he must
report his decision and "his reasons therefor to the committees of
substance in the area of insurance in each house of the Legislature
by March 31, 1980.
' '204
As a further aid to the department, the legislature created a
Workers' Compensation Rating Bureau within the department to
"study the data, statistics, schedules, or other information as it may
deem necessary to assist and advise the department in its review of
filings made by or on behalf of workers' compensation and em-
ployer's liability insurers."' 5
3. Excessive Profits
Since Florida is the first state to adopt wage loss on a large scale,
the insurance carriers have had no actual experience on which to
base their actuarial predictions. The legislature has mandated a
15% rate reduction and Dr. Chang has estimated the savings at
17.3%, but since the effect of a number of changes cannot be quanti-
fied, the actual savings may well be much more. To provide for that
eventuality, the legislature adopted an excessive profits provision.
206
The section provides that a profit will be found to be excessive if
the investment income generated by loss reserves exceeds the usual
profit plus 5% of earned premiums over the past three years.207 Since
rate filings traditionally provide for a 2.5% profit factor, the exces-
sive profits section will effectively limit the carriers to a 7.5% profit.
The legislature did not consider this unreasonable since it is three
times the profit the carriers ask for and is earned on mandatory
coverage.
4. Sunshine Law
Finally, the insurance carriers are to conduct their operations in
the sunshine. The "Sunshine Law'20 8 was made specifically applica-
202. For a complete explanation of this methodology, see L. Chang, Insurance and Rate
Making: A Discounting Procedure (June, 1979) (paper submitted to and on file with the
House Insurance Committee, 310 House Office Building, Tallahassee, Fla. 32304).
203. (1977).
204. Ch. 79-40, § 94, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.072).
205. Id. § 98 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.096).
206. Id. § 104 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.215). The provision was modeled on that
presently in effect for auto insurance. FLA. STAT. § 627.066 (1977).
207. Ch. 79-40, § 104, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.215).
208. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (Supp. 1978).
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ble to rate filings, and approvals, disapprovals, deviations, and ap-
peals of rate filings. 209 Further, committees of rating organizations
are required to hold open meetings, in the State of Florida, when
discussing "the necessity for rate increases or decreases, the deter-
mination of rates, the rates to be requested, and any other matters
pertaining to such rates," after three weeks' public notice.2 10
N. The Joint Underwriting Association
Another part of the workers' compensation system which was sub-
stantially revised was the joint underwriting plan. Considerable
confusion was evident during the course of hearings before the
House Insurance Committee, but the legislature's ultimate intent
had a visible effect shortly after the effective date of the act. To
understand the problem, some background is necessary.
Workers' compensation coverage, like auto coverage, is required
by the state. Whenever insurance coverage is mandatory, the prob-
lem arises of what to do with the people in two groups which find it
difficult to purchase the coverage. These groups are the "bad" risks
whose accident record makes the carriers unwilling to write a policy
and the "small" risks whose premiums are so small that the carriers
do not want to be bothered. There are two typical responses to the
need to provide the mandatory coverage. One is an assigned risk
plan; the other is a joint underwriting association. 21' Each method
provides for both kinds of risks. There seem to be two main differ-
ences. First, a joint underwriting association may require statutory
authorization, while an assigned risk plan does not, although its
plan of operation does require Department of Insurance approval.
Second, an agent who wants to do business with a joint underwriting
association must have a contract with one of the licensed servicing
companies. An agent who places business with an assigned risk plan
sends in the information and the premium check and the operators
of the plan handle the rest of the transaction.
Florida's workers' compensation system has an assigned risk plan
operated by the Florida Compensation Rating Bureau in Jackson-
ville. 12 Testimony before the House Insurance Committee indicated
that approximately 40% of the plan participants were there because
they were small employers, not because they were bad risks.2 1 3 Two
209. Ch. 79-40, § 97, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.093).
210. Id. § 95 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.091).
211. We wish to thank Mr. Bill Campbell, Workers' Compensation Administrator, Florida
Department of Insurance, for his assistance in clarifying these issues.
212. P.O. Box 8899, 9570 Regency Square Blvd., Jacksonville, Fla. 32111.
213. Testimony of Mr. Bob Ferguson, Florida Manager, Florida Workmen's Compensa-
tion Rating Bureau, before the House Insurance Committee (Mar. 21, 1979) (tape on file at
the House Insurance Committee, 310 House Office Building, Tallahassee, Fla. 32304).
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circumstances made this unfair. One is that all participants are
charged the maximum premium; the other is that all are subjected
to an 8% surcharge, applied as the result of a decision of former
Insurance Commissioner Ed Larson. This surcharge includes a 5%
agents' commission and 3% for overhead. To understand why these
circumstances are unfair, one must understand the ratemaking
process employed in the area of workers' compensation.
Workers' compensation rates are established for the insurance
industry as a whole in Florida. The National Council on Compensa-
tion Insurance, an insurance industry arm, collects data both na-
tionally and for Florida. Based on this data the Council determines
the level of rates necessary to cover claims and provides the ap-
proved profit. The filing is then made in Florida and the Insurance
Commissioner either approves or rejects it. Included in the filing is
a percentage for field acquisition and commission costs.21 1 However,
when the plan was established, this fact was ignored, and commis-
sions to producing agents were included in the surcharge. This guar-
anteed that plan rates would be higher than those charged in the
regular market. In addition, insurance carriers offer reductions in
established rate levels either through a discount to large employers
or by paying annual dividends. Employers purchasing coverage
through the assigned risk plan therefore not only missed out on any
chance for a dividend, but also were forced to pay a surcharge
whether they employed safety measures or had a good accident
record. This seemed patently unfair to many of the committee
members, who decided to take steps to reduce the burden on the
small employers covered by the plan.
This was done by significantly amending section 627.311, Florida
Statutes, 2 5 which is the statutory authority for organizing a workers'
compensation joint underwriting association, should the Depart-
ment of Insurance decide that one is necessary. 26 The new plan
consists of two subplans. Subplan "A" covers bad risks. To be a bad
risk an employer must have demonstrated accident frequency prob-
lems, a measurably adverse loss ratio over a period of years, or a
demonstrated attitude of noncompliance with safety requirements.
All risks who are not "bad" risks are covered under subplan "B"
which is established to cover good risks. A risk may be placed in
either subplan regardless of size. Subplan "A" is surchargeable, but
214. The current percentage is 17.5% of the first $1,000 of premium. Conversation with
Mr. Mark Trafton, Chief Actuary, Florida Department of Insurance (June 25, 1979). On total
net premium the figure would be 11.71%. Not all of this amount goes to agents as commission
since the figure also includes field acquisition costs.
215. (Supp. 1978).
216. Ch. 79-40, § 107, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.311).
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not subplan "B." Both subplans are subject to retrospective evalua-
tion. In this way a portion of premiums charged may be returned
to the employer if the loss experience is good. This was included in
order to reward risks in either subplan for favorable experience. In
effect, retrospective evaluation will provide an incentive to safety
management. The plan is authorized to pay commissions to produc-
ing agents not to exceed 5% of the total premium.'
The plan will operate under a board of governors named by the
Insurance Commissioner, consisting of three insurers, three employ-
ers and one producing agent. Since agents in effect stand between
both carriers and employers, it was presumed that they would carry
the swing vote on the board if a policy disagreement arose. All
aspects of the plan are subject to approval and continuous review
by the Insurance Commissioner. Although the board may designate
one or more servicing carriers for the plan, such designation is sub-
ject to the approval of the Insurance Commissioner. Thus, both the
problem of penalizing good risks just because they are small and the
problem of the surcharge were clearly addressed.
The Department of Insurance, however, has not responded to
these problems by establishing the joint underwriting association
authorized by chapter 79-40. Instead, the National Council on Com-
pensation Insurance recommended, and the Commissioner ap-
proved, that the 8% surcharge be dropped.2 8 The problem of the
small, good risk is being assessed by the Department of Insurance
in consultation with the National Council.2 1 1 Since the implementa-
tion of the new law will be watched very carefully, the legislature
may take further action if warranted. For the present, some re-
sponse to the legislature's concerns is already evident.
0. Collateral Sources
Section 627.7372, Florida Statutes, provides that in cases arising
out of auto accidents, the court shall instruct the jury to deduct the
value of benefits received from collateral sources from their ver-
dict.220 The definition of collateral source given in subsection (2)
217. The plan has an additional new wrinkle. It will employ full-time safety consultants
or engineers who will be available to advise insureds on safety management. The plan is also
required to report annually to the legislature on actions taken to encourage safety among
insureds. Servicing carriers are to provide support personnel to the plan's safety consultants
and personnel for claims adjustment. The plan is meant thus to operate as a model for the
industry as a whole.
218. Fla. Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Vol. IX, Bull. No. 37 at 2 (Aug. 22, 1979). In addition, a
graded commission scale was adopted to replace the flat 5%. Id.
219. Conversation with Mr. Bill Campbell, Workers' Compensation Administrator, Flor-
ida Department of Insurance (Sept. 21, 1979).
220. (Supp. 1978).
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does not specifically include workers' compensation benefits.
The problem was whether workers' compensation benefits should
be set off against a recovery in tort or whether such benefits should
be subject to the subrogation procedures under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act. 22' The legislature decided that to the extent subroga-
tion was a method of reducing costs in the workers' compensation
system, subrogation should be encouraged. Therefore, a new subsec-
tion (3) was added to section 627.7372, providing that "benefits
received under the Workers' Compensation Act shall not be consid-
ered a collateral source.
222
IV. CONSTrrUTIONALrrY
Although the 1979 changes are not really radical in terms of com-
pensation theory, they are a significant departure from the way
Florida's workers' compensation system has been functioning in the
past. Reaction to the reform has been decidedly mixed. Employer
groups and the insurance industry seem to like it; attorneys in gen-
eral are opposed. This attorney reaction is the reason for including
a section on constitutionality in this article. There will probably be
several challenges to the new law as soon as the appropriate case
arises3m The two most likely constitutional challenges are: (1) the
limited impairment schedule violates equal protection,2 4 and (2)
limiting appeals from orders of the deputy commissioners to the
First District Court of Appeal in Tallahassee is constitutionally pro-
hibited.2 Although the former may have some merit, neither is
patently unconstitutional.
A. The Impairment Schedule and Equal Protection
Under the old law, everyone with a permanent partial disability
received some compensation.226 The disability either resulted from
an injury appearing on the schedule, in which case the worker re-
ceived 60% of his average weekly wages for a specified number of
weeks,2  or from an unscheduled injury, in which case he received
221. FLA. STAT. § 440.39(2)-(4) (1977).
222. Ch. 79-40, § 115, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FiA. STAT. § 627.7372).
223. At the meeting of the Workmen's Compensation Section at the Florida Bar Conven-
tion in Orlando on June 14, 1979, Terrell Sessums announced the formation of a committee
whose purpose would be to screen cases to be used to challenge various parts of the new law.
Dudley Burton is to be the chairman.
224. Ch. 79-40, § 10, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15).
225. Ch. 79-312, § 1, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.25).
226. This discussion is limited to injuries causing permanent partial disabilities. Workers
who become permanently totally disabled are covered under FLA. STAT. § 440.15(1) (Supp.
1978).
227. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(a)-(t) (Supp. 1978).
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compensation based on his disability rating, defined as the greater
of either physical impairment or diminution of wage-earning capac-
ity.2 In addition, of course, the worker received medical benefits
and any compensation due to temporary disability to which he was
entitled .2'
Under the new law, the worker still receives medical and tempo-
rary disability benefits.230 However, everyone with a permanent par-
tial impairment now receives wage-loss benefits, but only if he suf-
fers more than a 15% loss in wages.2 3' In addition, a distinct class of
injured workers receives a lump-sum payment based on his degree
of permanent impairment. This impairment benefit is payable only
to those who have suffered an amputation, loss of 80% or more of
vision, after correction, or serious facial or head disfigurement.
The two questions which then arise because of the creation of this
class are:
(1) Is the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution violated if only this limited group
is given a benefit payment rather than all those who have perma-
nent impairments?
(2) Is the equal protection clause violated if only those with
amputations are benefited and not those with a corresponding loss
of use or if only those with facial or head disfigurement are compen-
sated and not those with a serious disfigurement of another part of
the body?
A review of the case law in this area indicates that the answer to
these two questions is the same: no, the equal protection clause is
not violated.
As the legislative investigation of workers' compensation pro-
ceeded in early 1979, it became clear that the members were deter-
mined to construct a system in which workers would be paid as
nearly as possible on the basis of actual economic loss resulting from
the injury. This determination was, of course, motivated by the high
costs of the system; but it was also motivated by the finding that
people with the same kinds of injury were receiving widely disparate
compensation awards. As already described, the major decision was
to adopt an actual wage-loss approach. In addition, however, an-
other determination was made and that was to ensure that those
really seriously injured were definitely compensated. This determi-
nation arose from two different sources. One was a reaction to the
228. Id. § 440.15(3)(u).
229. Id., §§ 440.13, .15(2), (4).
230. Ch. 79-40, §§ 8, 10, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 440.13, .15).
231. Id. § 10 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15).
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discovery that many people who were not seriously injured were
receiving a great deal of money from the system. The second was a
feeling that there is a qualitative difference among injuries and that
that difference should be recognized.
The legislature determined that amputations, almost total blind-
ness, and severe facial or head disfigurement are in a class by them-
selves. 232 The trauma, both physical and mental, the physical read-
justment, the emotional anguish, and the later social interaction
resulting when a limb is actually cut off is of a different order from
the reactions to the loss of use of a limb. At the very least, a limb
which does not function is still there. And though the probabilities
may be remote, some return of function may be possible in the
future because of a spontaneous process we may never be able to
understand or because of a medical breakthrough or from some
other reason. That probability is totally foreclosed if the limb is
actually severed.
Blindness or a very severe restriction of vision is also in a class
by itself because the ability to see is necessary in so many occupa-
tions. Many courageous people are functioning members of society
despite being blind. But this achievement is in no way diminished
by a recognition of their extraordinary efforts and of the help given
by sighted people, help ranging from inventing remarkable sensory
devices to matter-of-fact acceptance. Regardless of the progress our
society has made, blindness remains a severe handicap.
Severe facial and head disfigurement is also in a class by itself.
For some people, it might mean the end of a career in which physical
appearance is important. For others, their own emotional reaction
to the results of the accident might cripple their ability to function
in society. And for still others, the reactions of others might be the
most painful result. Facial and head disfigurement is a special kind
of disfigurement because in our society clothing does not cover it
up.23
The economic loss resulting from these injuries can be quantified
on an actual wage-loss basis for the most part. But given the severity
of these types of injuries, and given the very special kinds of prob-
lems associated with each, the legislature determined that some
special recognition should be made apart from the wage-loss bene-
232. Ch. 79-40, § 10, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15).
233. Most states have also recognized this special quality about disfigurement. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 8-51-105 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-308 (1979); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-32
(1976); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, § 138.8 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39, § 56 (1978); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 59-10-18.5 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1977); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.57(c)
(1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1007(c) (1978); WIs. STAT. § 102.56 (1979); Farleigh,
Disfigurement Awards Under Oregon Workmen's Compensation, 52 ORE. L. REv. 190 (1973).
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fits available to everyone. 34 The actual monetary award in the new
section 440.15(3)(a) is not very large, but the special recognition of
those who are truly injured is there. 35 Since these particular injuries
are different from others, the limited impairment schedule does not
violate the equal protection clause.
B. Limitation of Appeals from Orders of the Deputy
Commissioners to the First District Court of Appeal
36
As part of the 1979 changes, the legislature abolished the In-
dustrial Relations Commission and substituted the First District
Court of Appeal as the tribunal of appellate jurisdiction. 3 The
question has been raised as to the constitutionality of limiting ap-
peals to one part of a territorially-based system when coequal parts
of the same system serve the area from which an appeal originates.
The answer is that there is no such constitutional prohibition.
The hearings held by the deputy commissioners are not trials. This
is notwithstanding the fact that for some years these triers of fact
were called "judges of industrial claims." These hearing officers
have never been article V judges; they have always been within the
Department of Labor and Employment Security. 3 Nor has the
Florida Supreme Court ever held them to be judges.?5 If the deputy
commissioners are not judges, then they are administrative hearing
officers, though exempt from chapter 120.240 As such, review of their
actions comes under the provisions of article V, section 4(b)(2) of
the Florida Constitution which states that "[d]istrict courts of
appeal shall have the power of direct review of administrative ac-
tion, as prescribed by general law." There is thus no geographical
234. The situation is analogous to that in Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
1974), in which the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the automobile
no-fault act, which required exceeding a certain threshold before a suit could be brought at
common law for pain and suffering. In the same way, the 1979 changes in workers' compensa-
tion require certain types of severe injuries to be incurred before impairment benefits may
be paid, just as the monetary wage loss must exceed 15% of the worker's preinjury wage before
wage-loss benefits may be paid.
235. For example, using the AMA Guidelines, loss of an arm would be a 60% impairment,
resulting in a payment of $3500 [($50 x 50 points) + ($100 x 10 points)]. Ch. 79-40, § 10,
1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15).
236. We wish to thank Stephen Kahn, Esq., Legal Counsel to the President of the Florida
Senate, for his assistance in our preparation of this section.
237. Ch. 79-40, § 46, 1979 Fla. Laws 215, as amended by ch. 79-312, § 1, 1979 Fla. Laws
1645.
238. Previously the Department of Commerce. See ch. 79-40, § 35, 1979 Fla. Laws 215 (to
be codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.45).
239. The closest the court ever came was in Scholastic Systems, Inc. v. LeLoup, 307 So.
2d 166 (Fla. 1974), in which the term used was "quasi-judicial."
240. Ch. 79-40, § 3, 1979 Fla. Laws 215, and ch. 79-312, § 6, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.021).
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limitaticos. The legislature has complied with the constitution by
prescribing the appellate jurisdiction for workers' compensation by
general law. Nor has the legislature violated the constitutional re-
quirement that the courts "be open to every person for redress of any
injury""'' since that requirement does not specify where the court
must be.
Retaining the appellate tribunal in Tallahassee made both legal
and practical sense to the legislature. Having all appeals go to the
same court would preclude conflicting decisions among the five dis-
tricts and would develop a body of expertise in one locale.242 In
addition, those in the workers' compensation system are already
used to having appeals come to Tallahassee. And further, the In-
dustrial Relations Commission occupied facilities which could be
(and were) turned over to the First District Court of Appeal to
accommodate the court's inevitable expansion.243 There is thus no
constitutional problem with limiting appeals to the First District
Court of Appeal.
V. CONCLUSION
In the recent speech from which we have drawn the subtitle to this
article, Dr. Arthur Larson discussed two "old basics" which he felt
were necessary to any properly operating workers' compensation
system. These were the "centrality of the wage-loss concept" and
the "maximizing of administration and the minimizing of litigation
not going to the essence. ' 244 Dr. Larson pointed out that the heart
of the system is "replacement of wages" and that we lost this objec-
tive when states adopted injury schedules, which were an attempt
to approximate wage loss over a lifetime. At first, as in Massachu-
setts, these schedules were only for amputations; later came sched-
ules for loss of use; then for partial loss of use; then for amputations
and loss of use of the minor members; and finally, impairments of
the body as a whole. It was very easy to lose sight of the original goal
in the minutiae of the degrees of impairment, doctors, other experts,
and procedural niceties attendant on what became essentially tort
litigation.
Dr. Larson also stated that the lump-sum payment ruins the
system. The "sinister" thing about it is that everyone favors it:
employers and insurance carriers can close their files; employees get
241. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
242. The legislature created a Fifth District Court of Appeal, effective July 1, 1979. Ch.
79-413, § 1 1979 Fla. Laws 2190 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 35.01).
243. Ch. 79-312, § 1, 1979 Fla. Laws 1645.
244. Notes of Dr. Larson's speech are on file at the House Insurance Committee, 310
House Office Building, Tallahassee, Fla. 32304.
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a big wad of cash; and the attorney gets his fee. But the objective
of providing a replacement for a weekly loss in wages is not met.
In general, Dr. Larson felt that the 1979 Florida reform had gone
a long way back to basics. 4 5 There are, of course, other steps that
may have to be taken and other steps which ought to be taken. The
inclusion in the 1979 reform of impairment benefits for those most
severely injured may have to be deleted to avoid continual equal
protection challenges even though we feel the provision is not un-
constitutional and even though the original Massachusetts act and
almost all subsequent enactments contained such a schedule. Delet-
ing this final vestige of impairment benefits would be another step
back to basic compensation theory. In the interests of further
streamlining the system, the familar categories of temporary and
permanent partial and total could well be eliminated since the
wage-loss provisions will operate regardless of the labels attached to
the particular stage in the process.
And there are other possibilities for the future, ideas which Dr.
Larson called "new basics." The first of these is the recognition of
reemployment as the primary purpose of the workers' compensation
system. Oregon has proposed this26 and it may be worth some study
245. He compared Florida's enactment with Oregon's HB 3125 (1979) which was actively
considered but did not pass before the Oregon Legislature adjourned on July 4, 1979. He
would have preferred to see Florida completely eliminate both impairment benefits and
washouts as was proposed in Oregon.
246. Ore. HB 3125 (1979) reads in pertinent part:
Section 2. (1) When a worker who is employed by an employer who employs 10
or more subject workers incurs a compensable injury:
(a) The worker shall be reinstated by the employer to the former position of
employment, without reduction in wage, if the worker is able to perform the pri-
mary duties of the position.
(b) If the worker is not able to perform the primary duties of the former position,
the worker shall be reinstated to any other position in the employer's operation, the
primary duties of which the worker is able to perform.
(c) As used in this chapter, "primary duties" are those activities which com-
prise the substantial amount of time for, and are essential to, the performance of
that position after the employer has made reasonable accommodations for the
worker's impairments.
(2) The department may require reasonable modification of the job site of a
subject employer's operation if the modification would enable the worker and em-
ployer to comply with subsection (1) of this section.
(3) A worker may present a certificate of the worker's attending physician that
the worker is able to perform described types of activity which shall be prima facie
evidence of such ability.
(4) An employer is relieved of the obligation to reemploy an injured worker:
(a) If the worker's position has been eliminated by a reduction in force, but only
so long as the reduction in force lasts; or
(b) Two years after the date of injury or aggravation, but a worker who suffers
an aggravation has no reinstatement privileges unless employed by the employer
at the time of the original injury.
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by the Florida Legislature. The second is to take steps to coordinate
all income benefits programs so that all benefits payable for being
off the job would be substantially less than what the worker earned
on the job. This is obviously something which will have to be studied
seriously lest we become a society in which staying at home is more
profitable than going to work.
In the 1979 session, the Florida Legislature made significant
changes in our workers' compensation system. The motivation was
twofold: while the initial reason was to reduce costs, another moti-
vation soon assumed equal urgency and that was to do equity. The
legislature has given the Division a precise and comprehensive man-
date and the resources to implement this mandate to move the
delivery system much closer to the self-executing ideal. And to do
equity to injured workers, the legislature has made the basic as-
sumption that any permanent disability resulting from a work-
related injury should be compensable only if it has an adverse effect
on the worker's postinjury wages. Thus, though loss of a leg is a
terrible experience no matter whom it happens to, it matters more
in economic terms to a roofer than to a lawyer. It became clear to
the legislature that the two should not be treated the same. And
since guesses serve only to stir up litigation and inevitably result in
inequity, the obvious solution was to wait and see whether there was
in fact a wage loss before compensation was paid. Though we expect
to find flaws in the system which will need to be corrected, the
adoption of the wage-loss concept and the strengthening of the Divi-
sion should make Florida's workers' compensation system afforda-
ble, efficient, and, above all, equitable.
(5) An employer shall not discriminate against a worker with respect to hire or
tenure or any term or condition of employment because the worker has applied for
benefits, is receiving wage differential benefits or has invoked or utilized the proce-
dures provided for in this chapter or given testimony pursuant thereto. However,
nothing in this subsection prevents an employer from terminating a worker for
cause unrelated to the purposes of this chapter.
(6) A worker may enforce the provisions of this section by requesting a hearing
as provided in ORS 656.283.
(7) An employer is not excused from complying with this section because a
vacancy does not exist or the injured worker lacks seniority to fill a position. How-
ever, if a seniority system is in use, an employer need not demote or terminate
another worker with greater seniority in order to place the injured worker.
(8) The provisions of this section prevail over the terms of any collective bar-
gaining agreement entered into after the effective date of this 1979 Act.
Section 3. When the department determines that the worker will not be able
to return to the worker's previous employment, the department, as soon as is prac-
ticable, shall commence employment search, retraining or vocational rehabilitation
for the purpose of reemploying the worker at a wage as close as possible to the
worker's wage at the time of injury.
